In the recent literature, several hypotheses have been put forward in order to explain the decline of contributions in repeated public good games. We present results of an experiment which allows to evaluate these hypotheses. The main characteristics of our experimental design are a variation of information feedback and an elicitation of individual beliefs about others' contributions. Altogether, our data support the hypothesis of conditional cooperation with a selfish bias.
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Introduction
It is a well-documented, stylized fact that voluntary contributions in public goods experiments decline with repetition (Ledyard, 1995) . Various theories have been advanced which may account for this stylized fact. Some researchers on voluntary provision of public goods are convinced that people are conditionally cooperative; 1 in experiments, participants contribute the more the more others contribute even if freeriding is a dominant strategy. However, conditional cooperation seems to exhibit a selfish bias, as contributions increase less than fully proportionally with those by others (Fischbacher et al., 2001) . Hence, the selfish bias in conditional in combination with adaptation of beliefs about the others' contributions cooperation can explain a downward spiral of contributions. Alternative hypotheses that account for the decline of contributions include strategic play in early stages (Andreoni, 1988; Sonnemans et al, 1999) or errors that diminish over time (Andreoni, 1995; Palfrey and Prisbey, 1997) .
This article contributes to the investigation into the psychological motives for the contribution decline in repeated public goods experiments. For this purpose we have designed and run experiments in which we vary the information feedback and elicit the individual beliefs about others' contributions. The design, which is described in detail in section (2), allows a test of the aforementioned competing hypotheses (see also section (3)) under the assumptions that errors in contributions are uncorrelated to the beliefs about others' contributions and that strategic play is impossible if no information is divulged. The data, which we report in section (4), favor selfish-biased conditional cooperation as the source for the downward spiral of contributions over the competing hypotheses. Section (5) provides concluding remarks.
Experimental Design
The present study examines behavior in a 10-periods 3-players voluntary contribution mechanism in a partners design. In every period, each subject was given an endowment (50 experimental currency units) which could voluntarily be contributed toward a public good, or be kept to be consumed as a private good. The marginal percapita return from the public good was one half. Under standard assumptions, thus, free-riding is predicted. Subjects' beliefs (guesses) about the sum of contributions of their partners were incentive-compatibly elicited in each period. 2 Contributions and guesses were submitted simultaneously.
We considered two treatments in a between-subjects setting, information feedback being the treatment variable. In the information treatment (hereafter INFO), subjects received information feedback about the payoffs from the public goods game, broken up to the sum of partners' contributions, and from the guessing task after each period. In the control treatment (hereafter NoINFO), subjects received no information about payoffs and partners' contributions until the end of the experiment.
The experiment was computerized by Fischbacher's (2007) z-Tree. In total 36 inexperienced subjects participated (i.e., 18 subjects per treatment) who earned on average 18,300 Lira ≈ €9 ≈ $10. 3 At the beginning, instructions were read and subjects went through four exercises. 4 The experiment did not start until subjects had answered all questions correctly. Thus, we are confident that the game and the incentives were understood.
2 Our scoring rule, which assumes symmetry of subjective distributions, induced payoffs equal to the square of 100 less the difference between the guess and partners' contribution divided by 400. Thus, payoffs were in the interval [0;25] . 3 A session took 70 minutes. 4 The translated instructions and exercises are provided in Appendix A.
Rationale and Research Hypotheses
Our experimental design simultaneously elicits contribution levels and beliefs about others' contributions. Hence, we are able to test whether contribution is a function of belief. Some theories in economics and psychology disregard a positive causal relationship between contributions and beliefs in the finitely repeated game. The most basic theory would suggest that contributions are mere random choices which may be influenced by errors (for some recent evidence on errors see Schmidt and Neugebauer, 2007) . Though this suggestion seems rather unrealistic, it is an adequate benchmark hypothesis. However, also the standard maximization theories disregard the impact of contributions by others; rational players free ride on the contributions of the others, 5 and purely altruistic players who optimize efficiency contribute their entire endowment. Nevertheless, the existence of a positive relationship between beliefs and contributions is implied by theories of conditional cooperation (Croson, 2007) or strategic play (Kreps et al., 1982) . While the theory of conditional cooperation suggests that people contribute the more they expect others to contribute, the theory of strategic play proposes that people are opportunists who account for the possibility that others are conditional cooperators. Since conditional cooperators would react to free riders with decreasing their contributions, strategic players have incentives to cooperate too.
Due to the different feedback scenarios in our experimental treatments, INFO and NoINFO, we are able to distinguish conditional cooperation from strategic play, 6 since in the NoINFO treatment a strategic player has no incentive to contribute anything.
Moreover, the experimental design enables us to study belief formation of subjects in the repeated game. In particular, we test whether the guesses (which presumably stand proxy for the revealed beliefs) are a function of observed contributions of the others or whether they are unrelated. While the theory of rational expectations would suggest that guesses are not necessarily correlated to observations, beliefs are adapted according to observed choices in most learning theories. Equilibrium learning is one of the most relevant learning theories in the context of repeated public goods experiments. Although it may be easier to learn the free riding incentives by observing the contributions of others by imitation, 'virtual' equilibrium learning is even feasible in the conditions of the NoINFO treatment as people possibly think harder about the problem if they play it repeatedly. The argument is not far-fetched. "Learning without feedback" has shown to be relevant in some contexts, like the guessing game (Weber, 2003) or first price sealed bid auctions (Neugebauer and Perote, 2007) . • Adaptive equilibrium learning Table 1 records the outlined theories, based on which we next state several competing hypotheses on the reasons for the decline in the repeated public goods experiments. The first hypothesis for the contributions decline combines initial random choices (errors) and equilibrium learning with repetitions (Andreoni, 1988 (Andreoni, , 1995 Palfrey and Prisbey, 1997) . Finally the third hypothesis is based on the claim of some researchers that the decline could be caused through strategic play in early stages and equilibrium learning (Selten and Stöcker, 1986; Andreoni, 1988; Sonnemans et al., 1999) . In the NoINFO treatment, of course, strategic play is impossible.
Errors-(virtual)-equilibrium-learning hypothesis:
7 In contrast to the one-shot strategy method ('cold') applied by Fischbacher et al. (2001) , we study conditional cooperation with spontaneous decisions ('hot'). Experimental evidence on different behavior in hot and cold experiments was reported by Brosig et al. (2003) . out of 18 subjects in NoINFO and for all subjects in the INFO treatment. According to the binomial test, the probability that such an extreme event or an extremer one occurs by chance is 0.041 and 0.000 respectively.
We next study the trends of contributions and guesses in the experimental treatments with the two models (CT) and (GT) as recorded in Table 2 , where the C, G and T represent contribution, guess and time. The apostrophe indicates the estimations for the INFO treatment. The reported models involve random effects regressions of contributions and of guesses on a time trend. 11 Subject i's contribution and the guess of the partners' contributions in period t is denoted by cont it and guess it . From the outcomes of the regressions we draw the following conclusion.
Observation 3: While contributions and guesses decline when feedback about the partners' contributions is given (INFO), contributions and guesses do not decline when no feedback is given (NoINFO). 12 Thus, the virtual-equilibrium-learning hypothesis must be rejected.
Support:
The result follows from the time coefficients and standard errors as recorded in 12 The observation of no significant decline confirms Sell and Wilson (1991) who studied a public goods experiment with no feedback on partner's contributions without expectation elicitation. treatment (i.e., N = 6), and the other regressions were run on the individual choices (i.e., N = 18).
In our report, so far only the conditional-cooperation-adaptive-learning hypothesis has not received any rejection by the data. We next proceed with a more in-depth-analysis of the choice determinants in the experiment to test this hypothesis. For this purpose we estimate the following equations (1) and (2) (represented as models (CC) and (GG)
in Table 2 ) which capture the panel data dynamics for both contributions and guesses.
(1)
In equations (1) and (2), the random effects terms of each equation (η 1i and η 2i ) are supposed to be independent and identically distributed over the individuals and independent to the equations disturbances (ε 1it and ε 2it ) for each i and over all t. The equation (1) explains subjects' contributions in terms of their own past contributions, their guesses about others' contributions and the lagged average contribution of the other two group members (denoted by -i). 13 The equation (2) models subjects' guesses as a function of their lagged guesses and their partners' contributions. The two models are estimated by the generalized method of moments (GMM) to ensure the consistency of the parameter estimates of the corresponding dynamic panel data structures. 14 In particular, we used the Arellano-Bond estimator implemented in the STATA software 13 In the NoINFO treatment, instead of the contributions of the actual other two group members we use the average contributions of the other seventeen participants throughout the paper. 14 Note that dynamic panel data models (i.e. containing lags of the dependent variables as regressors) can not consistently be estimated by the standard random or fixed effects models. We use the one-step least squares approach which employs the lagged variables as instruments (see Arellano and Bond, 1991) .
package. The results, as recorded in Table 2 , 15 support the following observation which is in line with the conditional-cooperation-adaptive-learning hypothesis.
Observation 4:
In both treatments, contributions depend significantly on guesses. In the INFO treatment, guesses depend significantly on the lagged partners' contributions supporting the adaptive-learning-hypothesis.
Support: see Observation 2 and Table 2 . 16 The regressions were run on the individual choices (i.e., N = 18). 15 The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and the m 1 and m 2 statistics are also included in Table 2 to check the validity of the instruments and the first and second order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals, respectively. These tests confirm the validity of the instruments and the absence of misspecified dynamic structures. 16 It is noteworthy that no correlation for guesses can be identified in the estimation results for the NoINFO treatment. Without observing the others' contributions, the aggregate belief formation procedure is apparently not different from noise. In contrast to the NoINFO treatment, the information divulged in the INFO treatment seems to make the belief formation process less heterogeneous.
As pointed out above, Fischbacher et al. (2001) observed a selfish bias in conditional cooperation when they studied the one-shot game with the strategy method. Our data reveal a similar pattern of spontaneous decisions in the repeated game.
Observation 5: Subjects' guesses exceed their own contributions and also exceed, on average, the contributions of the others. The difference between guesses and others' contributions does not decline over time. Hence, the hypotheses of errors-equilibrium learning (in beliefs) and or unbiased or rational expectations must be rejected.
Support:
In each treatment, the average contributions of three subjects (N = 18) exceed their guessed average contribution levels of the others, the others (but one subject who expects the same from the others) contribute less than they expect from the others.
According to the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test, the exact likelihood that such an extreme event or an even extremer one occurs by chance is 0.003 in each treatment.
The individual contributions average 8.263 percentage points (INFO) and 9.633 percentage points of endowment (NoINFO) below the individuals' guesses (see also Figure 1 ), and so do the differences between guesses and others' contributions. The difference between guesses and others' contributions is the same in both treatments (the p-value of equal differences is 0.770). A random effects regression analysis shows that these differences do not significantly decrease as the coefficients of the slopes are insignificant (the corresponding p-values are 0.228 (NoINFO) and 0.717 (INFO)).
Concluding remarks
The present paper contributes to the resolution of the declining-contributions puzzle in repeated public goods experiments. Due to the experimental design, we were able to test several hypotheses regarding the formation of beliefs and the relation between contributions and beliefs. Our data show that beliefs are adapted according to past observations, and contributions are highly significantly correlated to beliefs. Therefore we can reject the hypothesis that subjects' contributions are random or due to errors (see Observation 2). If contributions were due to errors as has been brought to mind in the literature (see Andreoni, 1988 Andreoni, , 1995 Palfrey and Prisbey, 1997) then, according to our data, the errors must be in the beliefs. We found evidence that subjects' beliefs are biased in a self-serving way; subjects overconfidently believe that the others contribute more then themselves. This error in beliefs does not decrease or disappear in the repeated game. At least with respect to belief learning, thus, we must reject the adaptive-equilibrium-learning hypothesis (for an overview of learning models see Camerer, 2003) . Strategic play as the driving force behind the decay of contributions in the experiment (Andreoni, 1988; Sonnemans et al., 1999) must also be rejected, since contributions were greater in our benchmark treatment (NoINFO) in which strategic play was impossible.
The only viable hypothesis according to our data is the one of conditional cooperation and adaptive belief learning. As a matter of fact, adaptive learning was incomplete as the error in beliefs did not seize. Our result that individual contributions were smaller than the believed contributions of the others encourage the statement of Fischbacher et al. (2001) that subjects do not want to contribute more to the public good than their partners. In other words (see Isaac et al., 1988) , although subjects do not free ride, they apparently try to 'cheap ride' on the others. Based on our data we may conclude that the contributions appear to "spiral downwards" in the repeated setting with feedback information due to selfish-biased conditional contribution and downward adaptation of beliefs which, compared to contributions, are too optimistic.
Without the persisting optimism in the belief formation the decline of contributions would probably be steeper.
4)
During the entire experiment you will not receive any information about the other group members' contribution to the Group Project.
5)
However, you will be asked to guess the sum of the partners' contribution. In each Period you have to enter your Guess about this sum, i.e., a number between 0 and 100. Your PAYOFF FROM GUESSING will be determined as follows (in 2. negative calculate the sum between 100 and this result.
Then calculate the square of this difference and divide it by 400.
At the end of the experiment you will be told and paid the sum of payoffs (converted into Lire) you received during the experiment. This includes the payoffs from the Group Decision as well as from Guessing. Period INFO  ID  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10  GUESS1  45 40 65 45 80 50 45 50 35 75  10 40 
A.2 Exercises (translated from

